The wheel rims were likewise robust, chromed, stamped steel with a unique profile designed to hold the tire bead securely, even if pressure were low or lost. It must be and is found that Stallings lacks personal, first-hand knowledge about ordinary business terms and practices in the treadmill industry in general. Thus, the Defendant failed to present credible evidence sufficient to establish the defense element of ordinary business terms under § 547(c)(2)(C). The Committee is correct to dispute the amount of credit to which True Fitness is entitled under § 547(c)(4). True Fitness’s new value analysis is flawed in the calculation it deduces from its sales to Debtors in that the analysis treats Debtors as a consolidated entity rather than separately.
Rather, Debtors typically made payment 30 to 45 days after they were invoiced by True Fitness. Paragraph 7 of the Letter Agreement was modified by the parties on August 25, 1989, to provide that schwinn ebike True Fitness would invoice each of the four Schwinn Distribution Centers directly instead of sending its invoices to the Schwinn Accounts Payable Department in Chicago. See Lamar Dep., Ex.
Unlike the defendants in the above-cited cases, this Defendant did not establish its competitors’ accounts receivable or collections practices or the actual payment practices of its competitors’ customers. The Defendant’s only evidence on the issue of “ordinary business schwinn beach cruiser terms” was Stallings’ testimony which was limited to the contractual payment terms of the Defendant itself and of one other home use treadmill company, Precor. Thus, the Defendant failed to meet its burden to prove “ordinary business terms” under § 547(c)(2)(C).
Schwinn and True Fitness operated under the Letter Agreement from August 1989 until the Petition Date. Kevin T. Lamar (“Lamar”), Schwinn’s Group Product Manager of Fitness, testified that during this approximately three-year period, True Fitness sold thousands of treadmills to the Debtors each year. 8, p. 43 (lines 8-10, 13-16). Defenses which Defendant asserts to the Committee’s preference claim are the subsequent new value defense under § 547(c)(4) of the Code and the ordinary course of business defense under § 547(c)(2). The Committee contends that the Defendant at trial failed to prove either a subsequent new value defense or an ordinary course of business defense to any portion of the Committee’s preference claim. In 1896 Schwinn was founded, and by the end of that year, Schwinn bikes had more traffic than any other recreational bike company.
Stallings claimed that he gained familiarity with the contractual payment terms which Precor offered to its dealers through certain conversations he had with Precor dealers during his tenure at the Defendant. Stallings Tr., p. 74 (lines 1-11). As a result of his discussions with certain Precor dealers, Stallings asserted that Precor’s contractual terms to its dealers for payment were 30 days after invoice, the same contractual terms offered by the Defendant. Stallings Tr., p. 75 (lines 6-13). Stallings’ testimony on the ordinary business terms in the treadmill industry was based on and limited to only his purported familiarity with Precor’s contractual terms. Thus, the Defendant did not present any evidence as to the contractual payment terms offered by any of the other manufacturers in the treadmill industry.
By 1957, the Paramount series, once a premier racing bicycle, had atrophied from a lack of attention and modernization. Aside from some new frame lug designs, the designs, methods and tooling were the same as had been used in the 1930s. After a crash-course in new frame-building techniques and derailleur technology, Schwinn introduced an updated Paramount with Reynolds 531 double-butted tubing, Nervex lugsets and bottom bracket shells, as well as Campagnolo derailleur dropouts. The Paramount continued as a limited production model, built in small numbers in a small apportioned area of the old Chicago assembly factory. The new frame and component technology incorporated in the Paramount largely failed to reach Schwinn’s mass-market bicycle lines. In 1963 following the death of F.
Moreover, Defendant presented no evidence as to the actual payment practices of Precor customers or those of any other treadmill companies. Stallings admitted that he did not discuss with any Precor dealers their payment practices with respect to Precor; therefore, he has no knowledge regarding the actual payment practices of any Precor dealers. Stallings Tr., p. 76 (line 23)-p.